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~ No. 74-520 Motion to Expedite 




HAYMES Federal/ civil Timely 
SUMMARY: Resp brought this §1983 action in USDC W. D. N. Y. ( Curtin), 
challenging his summary transfer by N. Y. authorities from one maximum-security 
prison to another. The USDC granted summary judgment to petrs. CA 2 reversed, --holding that the maximum security classification of the two institutions was not dis -
positive and that the hardship involved in the mere fact of dislocation may be suffic ie n t 
.:_/Fetr 1 s petition is styled Montanye, Superintendent and Smith, Deputy Superin-






~ .... : ' . - 2 -to render resp1 s summary transfer - if a trial establishes that it was punitive - a 
denial of due process. Fetrs note that the Court recently granted cert in Freiser v. 
Newkirk, No. 74-107, which raises a due process issue with respect to summary 
transfer from a minimum-security to a maximum-security prison, and moves that 
consideration of the present petition be expedited so that if cert is granted, this case 
may be heard together with Freiser. 
FACTS: For unknown reasons, resp was discharged as an inmate law clerk in 
Attica's law library. Later the same day, prison authorities seized from resp a 
petition which he was circulating among the inmates. The petition, signed by 82 
inmates, was addressed to USDC Judge Curtin and stated, inter alia, that the signa-
tories were being deprived of legal assistance because of the removal of resp and 
another inmate law clerk. Two days later, resp was transferred without a hearing 
from Attica to the Clinton Correctional Facility, another maximum- security prison. 
Petr then filed what the USDC treated as a §1983 action, alleging that his transfer 
without hearing to Clinton, in retaliation for circulating the petition, deprived him 
of due process. The USDC granted summary judgment for petrs, finding that the 
seizure of the petition was proper under prison rules because it represented unau-
thorized legal assistance. The USDC also found no violation of due process in resp1 s 
transfer, reasoning that the alleged punitive nature of the transfer was not material 
because no claim was made that the facilities at Clinton are harsher or substantially 
different from those at Attica. 
CA 2 did not think it dispositive that both Attica and Clinton are maximum- secur itJ 
facilities with similar programs. Noting several hardships and deprivations involved 
in being transferred from one institution to another, ~- s ·eparation from family, 
administrative segregation upon arrival at a new facility and record of transfer, the 
CA held that resp1 s summary transfer - if found to be punitive by the trial court -




- - 3 - •·: ' -may be a denial of due process. 
CONTENTIONS: As in Freiser, petrs argue that the lower federal courts have 
taken divergent views of the necessity for providing hearings in connection with inter -
institution transfers of inmates. They note that Freiser involves the transfer of an 
inmate from a medium-security to a maximum security institution and that heard 
together Freiser and the present case will present to the Court the two co1nmon types 
of intrastate transfers which have been the basis for conflicting decisions. 
DISCUSSION: While the lower federal court cases do distinguish between transfers 
involving no change in custody level and those in which the character of the institution_ 
has changedJ' it is not clear that this case presents the adde? dimension petrs seek. 
The holding of CA 2 appears to be a rather narrow one. And, unlike Freiser there is n 
finding here that resp was transferred for disciplinary purposes. 
The petition is before the Court on a motion to expedite. 
There is no response. 
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HAYMES 
Response to motion to expedite 
Cert to CA 2 
(Kaufman, Smith, Timbers) 
Federal/ civil ( 198 3) 
SUMMARY: This case was before the November 15 Conference on a 
motion to expedite, sub nomine Smith v. Haymes. A response was requested 
Resp challenged his summary transfer from one maximum-security 
prison to another. The USDC granted summary judgment to petrs, N. Y. 
prison authorities. CA 2 reversed, holding that the maximum security 





- - 2 - -
hardships involved in the mere fact of dislocation may be sufficient to rend e :-
resp's transfer a denial of due process if a trial establishes that the transf e:-
/\/cl-e. 
was punitive. Petrs ~ the Court's recent grant in Preis er v. Newkir k , 
No. 74-107, which raises a due process issue with respect to a summary 
trans£ er from a minimum-security to a maximum-security institution. 
Petrs move that consideration of the present petition be expedited so that 
if cert is granted, this case may be heard together with Preis er. 
CONTENTIONS OF RESP: Resp characterizes CA 2' s opinion as 
deciding very little, noting that the CA merely reinstated his complaint, 
requiring the USD C to make findings as to ( 1) whether the transfer had in 
fact been imposed for punitive reasons, and (2) whether the prisoner 
s uffered significantly adverse consequences. They claim there is thus no 
final judgment and that review is inappropriate. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. ·,-
Wolf Bro. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1916); Bro. of Locomotive Firerr.e:: 
& Engineers v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 389 U.S. 327 (1967); 
Cobbledick v. U~ited States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940). Resp further argues that 
findings are necessary to a proper resolution of the due process issue and 
contrast the situation here w
0
ith the fully developed record in Preis er. 
DISCUSSION: This case would not appear to present the added 
dimension to prison transfer is sues that petrs contend. In its present 
posture, the case would seem to present for review only the narrow issue 
of whether summary transfers to like institutions is not~~ a violation o: 
due process. It does not appear that the issue can be approached in such a 
sterile context. 
The petition is before the Court on a motion to expedite. 
There is a response. 
Ginty CA Op in petn. 
, "' Ir- I..., A ~ TT 
- ~~ \'2..-<c-,4 Court Voted on . ................. , 19 .. . 
Argued . . ................. , 19 .. . Assigned . .. ............... , 19 . . . No.14• 52( 
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R e: No. 74-520 - Montanye (S11".)erintendent) v. Haymes (I will DENY) 
Held for No. 74-1 07 - Pre:.s e r v . Newkirk 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
For reasons undi sclosed, respondent wa s removed from assign-
ment as an inmate " law clerk' ' in Attica's law library. The institution 
seized from respondent a petition which he was circulating among the 
inmate s. The petition, signed by 82 inmates, was addressed to USDC 
Judge Curtin and stated, inter alia, that the signatories were being 
deprived of legal assistance because of the removal of respondent and 
another inmate law clerk. Two days later, respondent was transferred, 
without a hearing, from Attica to the Clinton Correctional Facility. Both 
institutions are maximum-security facilities. 
Petitioner then filed what the Distric_t Court treated as ·a § 1983 action, 
alleging that his transfer, without hearing, to Clinton was in retaliation 
for his circulating the petition and deprived him of due process. The 
District Court granted summary judgment for petitioner, finding that the 
seizure of the petition was proper under prison rules because it 
represented unauthorized legal assistance. The District Court also 
found no violation of due process in respondent• s transfer, reasoning 
that whether the transfer was punitive was not material because no claim 
was made that the facilities at Clinton are harsher or substantially 
different from those at Attica. Noting the absence of a trial record, the 
Court of Appeals reversed. In a rather opaque opinion, it seems to have 
held that, if the District Court found that the transfer was intended as 
punishment, it is not 11 dispositive that both Attica and Clinton are 
maximum security facilities with similar programs. 11 The mere fact 
of relocation may be sufficient to render the transfer a denial of due 
process if, in fact, it has consequences II sufficiently adverse to be 
properly characterized as punitive. 11 It is anything but a clear analysis 






The subject matter is in the same 11ball park11 as Newkirk , 
but since there is a rema::--id to the Disb.·ic t Court, my view is to wait 
on developments. 
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- - .. ~ - ~ . JUL '-I I q75 J 
Montanye v. Haymes, No . 74-520 Held for Preiser v. Newkirk 
I disagree with the Chief's recommendation. First, I do not find 
the Court of Appeals' opinion "opaque" or difficult to understand. 
It held that when transfer is used as punishment, "elementary fairness" 
...._ -•·~-... ~..... "'l 
• requires that the inmate be given notice and a hearing to review 
the evidence of the alleged misbehavior and to assess the effect 
transfer will have on the inmate's future incarceration. It added 
that a showing that prison authorities intended the transfer as 
punishment would not be enough to require a hearing unless the 
<.._adverse.J 
transfer in fact hadTconsequences to the prisoner, 2la&asnai but the 
opinion suggests that almost anything would qualify as sufficient 
adverse consequences: e.g., being farther away from • family, 
being separated from friends in the original prison, having greater 
difficulty communicating with counsel, being put in administrative 
segregation upon arrival at the new facility, losing personal 
belongings in the move, having medical or psychiatric treatment or 
.-.tars ~••I educational programs interrupted, or even ----- • 
having a notation of the transfer on his prison record. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals said that punitive transfer 
without hearing might present an equal protection issue if hearings 
are provided for all other disciplinary action. (That is, if -
in-prison discipline for a particular act requires a hearing, • 
equal protection would require a hearing for a transfer used as 
discipline for the same act.) Although this may stand as an 
alternative ground for the Court of Appeals' order, I do not think 





Second, I disagree with the Chief that the remand for 
h&&aaal trial on the facts (to see if this transfer was 
intended to be punitive and had 4 punitive effects) 
makes the issue r · £ a unripe for review. If, as we 
2 
discussed in analyzing Preiser v. Newkirk, ~ due process 
would not require hearings even for disciplinary transfers, 
this ruling • should be reviewed now, to save the • State 
~- ... ~ ... ..;.c:;,r.,.,-, 
an unnecessary trial. The case was decided o-q s~~'ry 
~:::::.:::=~~ ::::::::=::=::=:::::e 
.:i1111n• -i.ai:uasmnannna Respondent's complaint alleged that 
he was transferred for disciplinary reasons. CA2 held that 
this allegation, if proved, would establish a due process 
... ...- ......, 
right to a hearing. That legal ruling is ripe for review. 
Of course, if a majority of the Court ~ agrees with the 
Chief's distinction between disciplinary and nondisciplinary 
L necessarily , 
transfers, - a decision in this case would not/establish 
that no hearing is required for "administrative" transfers, 
but I feel confident that an opinion could be write en that ------". -· ---
would dispose of both questions for - all practical purposes . 
.- I t see~s to me that ~he disc ~~lina; y transfer issue is 
the more difficult, since hearings could ... serve no purpose 
at all in ~dministrative transfers, and it is worth resolving. 
kJ iifA.o I.AX Y"e.V 1<..w , -f-L.s 
~--- case will stand as precedent in CA2 for the proposition 
that all disciplinary transfers require notice and a hearing • 
Finally, a word about the dangers of mootness. This 
transfer occurred in 1972, and there is no hint in the papers 
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'"" 
asks for damaget or the deprivation he suffered after his 
~
transfer. I expect the claim for damages will turn out to 
ca1t. 
be legally f . 1 insufficient, as prison officials 
A 
probably establish that they acted in good faith under 
existing law. But the damages claim nonetheless will insulate 
the case from mootness, r k J Jg even if respondent is 
• released from prison • before the case can be decided. 
(Even if respondent could not recover damages after proving 
that a violation of his rights had occurred, it would be 
..... improper to anticipate that factual issue in ruling on 
this summary judgment is sue. lie a: :bl a zsn½; ni 
At this stage the only issue is whether respondent has 
alleged a cause of action and whether the facts of record 
establish a genuine issue of material fact that would affect 
respondent's right to recover. Prison officials' good faith 
would almost always be a factual issue requiring trial.) 
For these reasons, if you want to decide the issue that 
was mooted out in Preiser, I - think this case 
is appropriate for review, 
recommend that it be granted. 
' 








TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Penny Clark DATE: July 22, 1975 
No. 74-107 PREISER v . NEWKIRK 
When I finished studying the Chief Justice's opinion, 
I concluded that the difficulties I have with it are too 
numerous for oral presentation and thought it best to start 
out with a written memorandum. 
First, it is not clear from the opinion that the 
"legitimate entitlement" method of analyzing the "liberty" 
component of due process applies only in prison cases. The 
discussion is preceded by a statement that the case involves 
a prisoner, p. 8, but it does not say thereafter that this 
analysis is limited to that situation. The citations to Roth 
may be taken to sugest otherwise. Needless to say, this analysis 
cannot apply outside the prison context. To suggest that 
the constitutional protection of liberty depends on an express 
state-created expectation that one will be free of re s traint 
is simply untenable. 
Second, the opinion suggests that this new liberty 
analysis is not new at all, but is supported by prior opinions. 
It is not. In fact, Morrissey v. Brewer is incons i stent with 
the new analysis. The Morrissey opinion does not rely on any 





free on parole absent misconduct, and the opinion suggests 
there was none. Instead there was "at least an implied 
promise" that parole would not be revoked absent misconduct. 
On this basis the Court found a liberty entitlement strong 
en ough to require a hearing. 408 U.S., at 482. The Newkirk 
opinion contains a strong suggestion that an implied promise 
would not be enough. P. 10. Gagnon v,. Scarpelli simply 
followed Morrissey. Again there was no search for a statute 
2. 
or regulation creating an expectation that probation would not 
be revoked unless the prisoner misbehaved. Nor did Wolff v. 
McDonnell imply that in the abs ence of a statute no liberty 
interest would arise when a prisoner is transferred from the 
general prison population into solitary confinement. That case 
was easy, since there was a statute that created an expectation 
of both good time and freedom from solitary confinement absent 
misconduct. But the opinion does not rely on the statute 
in concluding that a prisoner had a due process right to a hearing 
before being placed in solitary for misconduct. At 571-572, n. 
19, the opinion notes the existence of the statute, but relies 
on the practice (apparently talking in general terms that 
apply to other states as well) of not putting a prisoner in 
solitary absent misconduct. An earlier section of the opinion 
even more clearly eschews exclusive reliance on the statutory 
entitlement: at p. 558, the Court said that "a person's liberty 





liberty itself is a statutory creation of the State." 
(emphasis added). 
3. 
My conclusion is that the Newkirk opinion is the first 
to insist on a state statute or rule creating an entitlement 7 
to liberty, even in the prison context. And it appears 
inconsistent with Morrissey. For that reason, I think if 
the Court now wants to adopt an "entitlement" requirement 
in Newkirk it at least should explain this new approach. 
In deciding whether to adopt this analysis instead of 
another route that would lead to the same result, I think it 
is important to consider how far the Court would go in 
rejecting liberty interests when there is no state-created 
entitlement. For instance, what i f a state expressly provided 
that a parolee had no legitimate expectation to remain out on 
parole and that he could be sent back to prison for any reason 
or no reason at all? Or if a state had no statute or regulation 
providing that prisoners shall not be placed in solitary 
confinement absent misconduct, and the prison had a practice 
of putting inmates in solitary for long periods without 
holding any disciplinary proceedings? I could not say that 
no liberty interest would be affected under such circl.llllstances, 
and I doubt that the Court would follow Newkirk to its logical 
conclusion. 
I also find a basic problem in the Newkirk opinion on 








nondisciplinary proceedings. First, Justice Marshall's dissent 
is right in saying that the District Court made a finding of 
fact to the effect that the transfer in this case was a 
disciplinary transfer. Petition at 42. The Court of Appeals 
did not disturb that finding, but simply ignored it in order 
to decide the case on a broader ground. This Court must accept 
that factual finding unless it is "clearly erroneous." Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 52(a). On the facts as revealed in the briefs and 
at argument, I do not think the finding can be considered clearly 
erroneous. And the Chief Justice's opinion does not say that 
it is, but simply relies on ''suggestions" that the transfer 
had no disciplinary purpose. P. 11. 
Second, the Newkirk opinion attempts to distinguish 
Wolff (as well as Morrissey and Gagnon) on the ground that they 
involved disciplinary action, and it purports to confine the 
ruling that there is no "liberty" interest to cases of 
nondisciplinary transfers. Pp. 7, 11, 12, 14. Neither the 
distinction nor the limitation make sense under customary due 
process analysis. The purpose of governmental action--whether 
punitive, disciplinary, or otherwise--has always been thought 
relevant only to the second stage of the due process analysis: 
in deciding, once you have found a "liberty" or "property" 
interest that deserves protection, what procedural protections 
(if any) are required. It is almost exclusively relevant to 





it is necessary to protect the person affected, and whether 
the need for a hearing is outweighed by state interests. (It 
may also be relevant when the asserted "liberty" interest 
rests on harm to reputation, but even then a disciplinary 
proceeding would affect "liberty" only if it resulted in 
5. 
a record of misconduct, and a proceeding not labeled "disciplinary" 
conceivably could affect reputation just as much.) 
I therefore conclude that the only way to draw a 
t enable distinction between disciplinary proceedings and non-
disciplinary proceedings, assuming you want to do so, is to -
recognize that a prisoner has a slight liberty interest in 
his status quo in a medi·um-s ecurity institution, but to conclude 
that his slight interest is substantially outweighed by the 
state's interest in efficient prisoner placement, absent a 
disciplinary label. Disciplinary transfers could be distinguished 
because they depend entirely on facts individual to one inmate 
rather than mass transfers that would depend instead on 
comparisons among inmates, when a hearing would serve no purpose. 
But, if the Newkirk opinion is to remain grounded in a holding 
that there is no "libert y" interest, the purported distinction 
between disciplinary and nondisciplinary trans fers cannot stand. 
I think that the Newkirk analysis is outside the mainstream 
of this Court's due process precedent, and I do not think it 
would stand the test of hard cases. I strongly recorrnnend that 







liberty interest but concludes that in no circumstances can 
it outweigh the state's need to transfer prisoners for various 
reasons, including simple efficiency. I do not think we 
would have to distinguish between disciplinary and non-
disciplinary transfers. We could reject the distinction, on 
the ground that litigation to determine which transfers were 
disciplinary would be as burdensome (perhaps more) to prison 
officials as holding a hearing in every transfer case. I think 
we would have to leave open the question whether a transfer 
that results in a record of serious misconduct might not 
affect the "liberty" interest in reputation (and possible future 
parole) substantially enough to require some hearing-type 
procedure, but that question is not presented in this case 
because no notation of mis conduct is in respondent's prison 








TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Greg Palm DATE: April 21, 1976 
No. 74-520 Montanye v. Haymes 
No. 75-252 Meachum v. Fane 
Since Penny has already given you a memo on the 
Chief's opinion in this case (which you joined last Spring) 
and since I agree with much of what she said, this is a brief 
summary of my views in the area. 
I think that prisoners do have a liberty interest 
that is implicated in the decision to transfer them from one 
penal institution to another. This liberty interest consists 
generally of such facts as: (1) distance from family and 
counsel; (2) educational/rehabilitative opportunities; 
(3) new/old environment problem; (4) type of institution re 
freedom of movement: minimum to maximunj. gradient. It is 
also my conclusion, however, that when the prisoner's general 
liberty interest is balanced against the interest of the state 





be provided in any case except those where the transfer 
- is being us ed as a disciplinary measure because the 
* 
prisoner engaged in particular conduct• 
2. 
I therefore would disagree with any opinion that 
rested on the notion that absent a statutory entitlement, 
prisoners have no cognizable liberty interest. Of the two 
exceptions that I have outlined, I am less certain about the 
need for (1)"!' On balance, I believe that the exception is 
necessary to ensure that the State does not utilize the transfer 
mechanism as a substitute for sanctions such as solitary 
confinement or alike for behavior that it wishes to discourage. 
A hearing would be useful in such situations because the issues 
would be "adjudicative" facts relating to the actions of the 
particular prisoner. There are two difficulties: (1) need 
* (I would require that the State indicate the reason 
for the transfer and would also rely on its good faith not to 
lie about the reason - that is, if the State claims it is 
transferring the prisoner because of administrative reasons, 
and the prisoner claims it is because I am accused of doing X 








to ensure that the exception does not become a mechanism 
by which prisoners can claim punishment for act* in order 
to get a hearing - my "good faith" assumption and reasons 
should satisfy this problem - and (2) even if used as 
punishment, the liberty loss involved in some transfers is 
likely to be so small as to make a hearing unnecessary. e 
• ""' -I suspect, however, 
that through my disciplinary/good faith requirement the burden 
on prison authorities will not be unreasonable in light of 
* the prisoners' potential liberty interests. 
Greg 
* Even if hearings are required only in the two 
cases I have specified, any opinion should, of course, emphasize 
the special circumstances of the prison which justify less 
process then in almost any other situation. 
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Mr. Justice Stevens 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA'l'ffl 
No. 74-520 
Ernest L. Montanye, Former 
Superintendent, Attica Cor-
rectional Facility, et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Rodney R . Haymes. 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sec~ 
ond Circuit. 
[June -, '1976] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
On June 7, 1972, respondent Haymes was removed 
from his ll,ssignment as inmate clerk in the law library 
at the Attica Correctional Facility in the State of New 
York. That afternoon Haymes was observed circuh\,ting 
among other inmates a docurp.e:p.t prepared by him and 
at the time signed by 82 other prisoners. Amo11g other 
things, each signatory complained that he had been de-
prived of legal assistance as the result of the removal of 
Haymes and another inmate from the prison law library.1 
1 The document read as follows : 
"Hon. Judge John T . Curtin: 
"I am writing to complain that I am now being deprived of legal 
assistance as a result of inmate Rodney R. Haymes and John Wash-
ington being removed from the prison law library. 
"Smee the removal of the above two from the law library, I can-
not any longer obtain any legal assistance either in the nature of 
obtaining the proper applicable case law corresponding with the 
particular issue contained in my case, as well as assistance in pre-
paring my post-conviction application to the courts. 
"The major problem and reason for my 11ot being able to obtain 
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The document, which was addressed to a feder-al judge 
but sought no relief, was seized aD:d held by prison au-
thorities. On June 8, Hayme~ was advised that he would 
be transferred to Clinton Correctional Facility, which, 
like Attica, was a maximum-security institution. The 
transfer was effected the next day. No loss of good time, 
segregated confinement, loss of privileges or any other 
disciplinary measures accompanied the transfer. On 
August 3, Haymes filed a petition with the United States 
District Court which was construed by the judge to be an 
application under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1343 seeking relief against petitioner Montanye, the 
then superintendei:it at Attica. · The petition complained 
that the seizure and retention of the· document, despite 
requests for its return, not only vfolated Administrative 
Bulletin No. 20. wtich allegedly made any communica-
tion to a court privileged and confidential, but also in-
fringed Haym(;ls' federally guaranteed right to petition 
the court for redress of grievances. It further asserted 
that Haymes' removal to Clinton was to prevent him 
from pursuing his remedies and also was in repris~l for· 
his having rendered legal assistance to various prisoners 
as well as having, along with others, sought to petition 
the court for redress. 
In response to a show-cause order issued by the court,. 
law library officer whom goes out of his way to circumvent inmates 
legal assistance. 
"I . feel that this was obviously the same reason why this officer 
has had Rodney Haymes and John Washington removed from the 
law library whereby they no longer have proper access to either· 
the law b_ooks or myself and the other inmates whom they are 
legally assisting. 
"Wherefore, I feel that my constitutional rights to adequate access; 
to the courts for judicial review and redress is being violated as a 
<ljrll_ct tesult of the ·circumstances and conditions herein set forth_ 
(~ig_ned by 8.2. inmates .) " 
-
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petitioner Brady, the correctional officer at Attica in 
charge of the law library, stated in an affidavit that 
Haymes had been relieved from his assignment as an 
inmate clerk in the law library "because of his continual 
disregard for the rules governing inmates and the use of 
the law library" and t,hat only one of the inmates who 
had signed the petition being circulateq by Haymes had 
ever made an officilll request for legal assistance. The 
affidavit of Harold Smith, Deputy Superintendent of 
Attica, furnished the court ~ith Paragraph 21 of the 
Inmate's Rule Book,2 which prohibited an inmate from 
furnishing legal assistance to another inmate without 
official permission and with a copy of a bulletin board 
notice directing inmates with legal problems to present 
them to Officer Brady-inmates were in no circumstances 
to set themselves up as legal counsellors and receive pay 
for their services.3 The affidavit asserted that the pe-
tition taken from Haymes was being circulated "in direct 
disregard of the above rule forbidding legal assistance 
without the approval of the Superintendent" and that 
Haymes had been cautioned on several occasions about 
assisting other inmates withovt the required approval. 
Haymes responded by a motion to join Brady as a 
2 lnmates are prohibited except upon approval of the Warden, 
to assist other inmates in the preparation of legal papers. 
3 The notice read as follows : 
"Office of Superintendent 
April 25, 1972 
'•To ALL CONCERNED: 
"In all instances where inmates desire .assistance in the use of the 
Law Library, they are to present their problems to Correction Officer 
Brady, who will assist them to the extent necessary or will assign 
inmates on the Law Library staff to particular cases. 
"Under no circumstances are inmates to set themselves up as 
' legal counselors' and receive pay for their r,ervices. 
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defendant, which was granted, and with a counteraffi-
davit denying that there was a rule book at Attica, reas-
serting that the document seized was merely a letter to 
the court not within the scope of the claimed rule and 
alleging that his remova1 from the law library, the seizure 
of his petition a,nq !+is transfer to Cli~ton were acts of 
reprisal for his having attempted to furnish legal assist-
ance to the other prisoners rather than merely hand out 
library books to them . 
After retained counsel had submitted a memorfl,ndum 
on behalf of Haymes, the District Court dismissed the 
action. It held that the rule against giving legal assist-
ance without consent was reasonable and that the 
seizure of Haymes' document was not in violation of the 
Constitution. The court also ruled that the transfer to 
· Clinton did not violate Haymes' rights: "Although a gen-
, eral allegation is made that punishment was the motive 
for the transfer, there is no allegation that the facilities 
at Green Haven are harsher or substantially different 
from those afforded petitioner at Attica ... petitioner's 
transfer was consist~mt with the discretion given to 
prison officials in exercising proper custody of inmates.'~ 
. App. 26a. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 
505 F. 2d 977 (1974). Because the District Court had 
considered affidavits outside the pleadings, the ilismissal 
was deemed to h v been a summa 'ud ~ent under 
Rule , Fe eral Ru es o 1v1 rocedure. he judg-
ment was ruled erroneous because there were two unre-
solved issues of material fact: whether Haymes' removal 
to Clinton was punis~ment for a disobedience of prison 
rules and if so whether the effects of the transfer were, 
sufficiently burdensome to require a hearing under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The court's legal theory was that Haymes should no, 
- -
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more be punished by a transfer having harsh conse-
quences than he ishould suffer other deprivations which 
under prison rules could not be imposed without follow-
ing specified procedures. Disciplinary transfers, the 
Court of Appeals thought, were in a different category 
from "administrative" transfers. "When harsh treat-
ment is meted out to reprimand, deter or reform an indi-
vidual, elementary fairness demands that the one pun-
ished be given a satisfactory opportunity to establish 
that he is not deserving of such handling ... the specific 
facts upon which decision to punish are predicated can 
most suitably be ascerta,ined at an impartial hearing to 
review the evidence of the alleged misbehavior, and to 
assess the effect which the transfer will have on the 
inmate's future incarceration." 505 F. 2d, at 980. The 
Court of Appeals found it difficult "to look upon the 
circumstances of transfer as a mere coincidence," id. 979; 
it was also convinced that Haymes might be able to 
demonstrate sufficiently burdensome consequences at-
tending the transfer to trigger the protections of the 
Due Process Clause, even though Attica and Clinton 
were both maximum-security prisons. The case waS' 
therefore remanded for further proceedings to the Dis-
trict Court. We granted certiorari, ·_ U. S. -, and 
heard the case with Meachum. We reverse the judg-
ment of the Court of Appea.lis. 
\ 
The Court of Appeals did not hold~ as did the Court 
of Appeals in Meachum v. Fano, ante, that every dis-
advantageous transfer must be accompanied by appro-
priate hearings. Administratiye transfers, although per-
haps having very similar consequences for the prisoner, 
were exempt fro:rn the Court of Appeals ruling. Only 
disciplinary transfers having substantial adverse impact 
on the prisoner were to call for procedural formalities. 
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in this case. We held in Meachum v. Fano, that no Due 
Process Clause liberty interest of a duly convicted prison 
inmate is infringed wh.en he is transferred from one 
prison to another within the State, whether with or with-
out a hearing, absent some right or justifiable expecta-
tion rooted in state law that he will not be transferred 
except for misbehavior or upon the occurrence of other 
specified events. We therefore disagree with the Court 
of Appeals' general proposition that the Due Process 
Clause by its own force requires hearings whenever prison 
authorities transfer a prisoner to another institution be-
cause of his breach of prison rules, at least where the 
transfer may be said to involve substantially burden-
some consequences. As long as the conditions or degree 
of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected do not 
exceed those normally incident to a criminal conviction 
and are not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the 
Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's 
treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight. 
' The Clause does not require hearings in connection with 
transfers whether or not they are the result of the 
'inmate's misbehavior or may be labeled as disciplinary 
or punitive. 
We also agree with the State of New York that under-
the law of that State Haymes had no right to remain at 
any particular prison facility and no justifiable expec-
tation that he would not be transferred unless found 
guilty of misconduct. Under New York law, 'adult per-
sons sentenced to imprisonment are not sentenced to 
pl),rticular institutions but are committed to the custody 
of the Commissioner of Corrections. Ife receives adult, 
male felons at a maximum-security reception center for 
initial evaluation and then transfers them to specified in-
stitutions. N. Y. Corr. Law § 71 (1); 7 N. Y. C. R. R. 
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oy statute to "transfer inmates from one correctional fa-
cility to another." N. Y. Corr. Law § 23 (1). The Court 
of Appeals reasoned that because under the applicable 
state statutes and regulations, various specified punish-
ments were reserved as sanctions for breach of prison 
rules and could not therefore be imposed without appro-
priate hearings, neither could the harsh consequences of 
a transfer be imposed as punishment for misconduct ab-
sent appropriate due process procedures. But under-
the New York law, the transfer of inmates is not condi-
tional upon or limited to the occurrence of misconduct. 
The statute imposes no conditions on the discretionary 
power to transfer and we ar~ advised by the State that 
no such requirements have been promulgated. Trans-• 
fers are not among the punishments which may be im-
pos~d only a.fter a prison disciplJ.nary hearing. N. Y. C'. 
R.R. § 253.5. Whatever part an inmate's behavior may 
play in decision to transfer; there is no more basis in' 
New York law for invoking th~ protections of the ,Due 
Process Clause than we found to be the case under the 
Massachusetts law in the Meachum case. 
The judgment of the Cot\rt of Appeals is reve~ed and 
the case is remanded to that court for further proceed-
ing_s, cQnsistent with this opinion. 
So or.der.ed.. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
- -.i,u:p-rtmt (IJcud cf tJrt ~nittb .i,tatts 
Jhudp:ttghm. ~. (IJ. 2.llffeJl.$ 
June 2, 1976 
Re: No. 74-520, Montanye v. Haymes 
Dear Byron, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
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CHAMBERS O F 
J U STICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 2, 1976 
Re: 74-520 - Montanye v. Haymes 
Dear Byron: 
In due course I shall circulate a dissent. 
Sincerely, 
~ , 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
- -~nprttttt (!Janri !tf tlft ~b ~taus 
jiriutqinghm. ~. (4. 2llffe~, 
CHAMBERS O F" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST / 
June 3, 1976 
Re: No. 74-520, Montanye v. Haymes 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your opinion for the Court. 
Sincerely, 
,. ~ 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
.. 
s-£ 
To: The Chief Justice - - Mr. Justice Brennan Mr . J us tice St ~wart Mr. Just ice Marshal l 
Mr . J ust.i ce Blackmun 
Jtr. Jus t i ce Powell 
Mr . Justice R~hnquist 
Mr . Justice Stevens 
From: Mr. Just i ce White 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
No. 74-520 
Ernest L. Montanye, Former 
Superintendent, Attica Cor-
rectional Facility, et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Rodney R. Haymes. 
On Writ of Certiorari tq 
.the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sec-, 
ond Circuit. 
.. [June -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the 
Court. ·· 
On Jun~ 7, 1972, respondent Haymes was removed 
from his assignment as inmate clerk in the, law library 
at the Atti~a Correctionp.1 Facility in the State of New 
York. That afternoon Haymes was observed circulating 
among other inmates-a doct,1ment prepared- by him tl~,d 
at the time signed by 82 other prisoners. Among other 
things, each signatory complained that he had been d~"" 
prived of legal assistance as the .result of the removal of 
Haymes and another inmate from the prison law library, 1 
1 The document read as follows: 
"Hon. Judge John T Curtin ; 
"I am writing to complain that I am now being deprived of legal 
assistance as a result of inmate Rodney R. Haymes and John Wash-
. ington being removed from the pr1Son law library. 
"Since the removal of the above two from the law library, I can-
not any longer obtain any legal assistance either m t he nature of 
obtammg ·the proper applicable case law correspondmg with the-
particular is.sue .contamed in my case, as well as assistance in pre-· 
parmg my post-conviction applicat'ion to the courts . 
"The major problem and reason for my not bemg able to obtain 





The document, which was addressed to a federal judge 
but sought no relief, was SEl_ized and held by prison au-. 
thorities. On June 8, Haymes was advised that he would 
be transferred to Clinton Correctional Facility, which, 
like Attica, was a maximurp-security institution. The 
transfer was effected the next day. No loss of good time, 
segregated confinement, loss of privileges or any other 
disciplinary measures accompanied the transfer. On 
August 3, Haymes filed a petition with the United States 
District Court which was c~nstrued by the judge to be an 
app~ication under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1343 seeking relief against petitioner Montanye, the 
then superintendent at Attica. The petition complained 
that the seizure and retention of the document, despite 
requests for its return, not only violated Administrative 
Bulletin No. 20, which allegedly made any communica-
tion to a court privileged and confidential, but also in~ 
fringed Haymes' federally guaranteed right to petition 
the court for redress of grievances. It further asserted 
that Haymes' removal to Clinton was to prevent him 
from pursuing his remedies and also was in reprisal for 
his having rendered legal assistance to various prisoners 
as well as having, along with others, sought to petition 
the court for redress. 
In response to a show-cause order issued by the court, 
law library officer whom goes out of his way to circumvent inmates 
legal assistance. 
"I feel that this was obviously the same reason why this officer 
has had Rodney Haymes and John Washington removed from the 
law library whereby they no longer have proper access to either 
the law books or myself and the other mmates whom they are 
legally assisting. 
"Wherefore, I feel that my constitut1onal nghts to adequate accesa 
to the courts for Judicial review and redress 1s bemg violated as ll. 
•i'hrect result of the circumstances and conditions herein set forth. 
(S1gned by 82 inmates.) " 
-
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petitioner Brady, the correctional officer at Attica m 
charge of the law library, stated in an affidavit that 
Haymes had been relieved from his assignment as an 
inmate clerk in the law library ''because of his continual 
disregard for the rules governing inmates and the use of 
the law library" and that only one of the inmates who 
had signed the petit~on being circulated by Haymes had 
ever made an official request for legal 8$Sistance. The 
affidavit of Harold Smith, Deputy Superintendent of 
Attica, furnished the court with Paragraph 21 of the 
Inmate's Rule Book,2 which ptohibited an inmate from 
furnishing legal assistance to another inmate without 
official permission and with a copy of a bulletin board 
notice directing .inmates with }egal problems to present 
them to Officer Brady-,nmates were in no circumstances 
to set themselves up as legal counsellors and receive pay 
for their services.3 The affidavit asserted that the pe-
tition taken from Haymes was being circulated "in direct 
disregard of the .above rule forbidding legal assistance 
without the approvai of the Superintendent" and that 
Haymes had been cautioned on several occasions about 
assisting other inmates without the required approval. 
Haymes responded by a motion to join Brady as a 
2 Inmates are prohibited except upon approval of the Warden, 
to as,nst other inmates m the preparation of legal papers. 
3 The notice read as follows : 
"Office of Superintendent 
April 25, 1972 
To ALL CONCERNED " 
"In all mstances where mmates desire assistance in the use of the 
Law Library, they are to present their problems to Correction Officer 
Brady, who will assist them to the extent necessary or will assign 
inmates on the Law Library staff to particular cases. 
"Under no circumstances are inmates to set themselves up as 
·legal counselors' and receive pay for their services. 
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.defendant, which was granted, and with a counterafij.-
davit denying that there was n. rule book at Attica, reas.-
s.erting that the document seized was merely a letter to 
$he court not within the scop~-of the claimed rule and 
alleging that his removal from the law library, the seizure 
of his petition and his transfer to Clinton were acts_ of 
reprisal for his having attempted to furnish legal assist-
ance to the other prisoners rather than merely hand out• 
library books to them. 
· After retained counsel had submitted a memorandum 
on behalf of Haymes, · the -District Court dismissed the 
action. It held that the rule against giving legal assist-
1;tnce without consent was reasonable and that the 
~eizure of Haymes' document was not in violation of the 
Constitution. The court also ruled that the transfer to · 
Clinton did not violate Haymes' rights: "Although a .gen-
eral allegation is made that punishment -was the motive·· 
for the transfer, there is no allegation that the facilities· 
at Green Haven are harsher or substantially different 
from those afforded petitioner at Attica .. - . petitioner's-: 
transfer was consistent with the discretion given to,· 
prison officials in exercising proper custody of inmates.": 
App. 26a. 
The Court of Appea.Is for the Second Circuit reversed .. 
505 F. 2d 977 (1974). BecausE'! the District Court had' 
considered affidavits outside the pleadings, the dismissal 
was deemed t,o have been a summary judgment under-· 
Rule 56, ·Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The judg-
ment was ruled erroneous becaµse there were two unre-
solved issues of material fact : whether Haymes' removar 
to Clinton was punishment for a disobedience of prison 
rules and if so whether the effects of the transfer were· · 
sufficiently burdensome to require a hearing under the-
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
T~e court's leg~ theor;r was that Haymes should_ no•· 
-
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more be punished by a transfer having harsh conse-
quences than he should suffer other deprivations which 
under ptison rules could not be imposed without follow-
ing specified procedures. Disciplinary transfers, the 
Court of Appeals thought, were in a different category 
from "administrative" transfers. "When harsh treat-
ment is meted out to reprimand, deter or reform an indi-
vidual, elementary fairness demands that the one pun-
ished be given a satisfactory opportunity to establish 
that he is not deserving of such h1wdling ... the specific 
facts upon which decision to punish are predicated can 
most suitably be ascertained at an impartial hearing to 
review the evidence of the alleged misbehavior, and to 
assess the effect which the transfer will have on the 
inmate's future incarceration." 505 F . 2d, at 980. The 
Court of Appeals found it difficult "to look upon the 
circumstances of transfer as a mere coincidence," id. 979; 
it was also convinced that Haymes might be able to 
demonstrate sufficiently burdensome consequences at-
tending the transfer to trigger the protections of the 
Due Process Clause, even though Attica and Clinton 
were both maximum-security prisons.4 The case was 
~ The Court of Appeals found "that the hardship involved in the 
mere fact of dislocation may be sufficient to render Haymes' sum-
mary transfer-if a trial establishes that 1t was punitive-a deruaJ 
of due process." 505 F . 2d, at 981. The court said · 
"The facts of this case m11y provide a good illustration of the 
real hardship m bemg shuttled from one institution to another 
After being sent to Clinton, Haymes found himse/f several hundred 
miles away from his home and family in Buffalo, New York. Not 
only was he effectjvely separated by the transfer from his only 
contact with the world outsicle the prison, but he also was removed 
from the friends he had made among the inmates at Attic& and 
forced to adjust to a new environment whf're he may well have 
been regarded as a troublemaker. Contacts with counsel would 
necessarily have beep ' more difficult. A tra.psferee sutfers other 






therefore remanded for further proceedings to the Dis-
trict Court. We granted certiorari, - U. S. -, and 
heard the case with Meachum v. Fano, ante. We re-
verse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
. The Court of Appeais diq not hold~ as did the Court 
of Appeals in Meachum v. Fano, th,at every dis-
advantageous trfl,nsfer must oo accompanied by appro-
priafo hearings. Administrative transfers, although per ... 
haps having very similar consequences for the prisoner.~ 
were exempt from the Cot,1.rt of Appeals ruling. Only 
disciplinary ' transfers having substantiitl adverse impact. 
on the prisoner were to call for procedural formalities .. 
Even so, our decision in Meachum requires a reversal 
in this case. We held in Meachum v. Fano, that :,;io Due 
Process Clause liberty interest of a duly convicted prison 
inmate is infringed when he is transferred from one 
prison to another within the State, whether with or with-
out a hearing, absent some right or justifiable expecta-
tion rooted in state law that he will not be transferred 
except for misbehavior or upo11 the occurrence of other 
specified ·events. We therefore disagree with the Court 
of Appeals' general proposition that the Due Pi:-ocess 
Clause by its own force requires hearings whenever prison 
authorities transfer a prisoner to another institution be-
cause of his brefl,ch of prison rules, at lell,St where the 
transfer may be said to involve substantially burden-
some consequences. As long as the conditions or degree 
tive segregation upon arrival a.t the new facility, 7 N. Y. C. R. R. 
Part 260 ; personal belongmgs are often lost ; he may be deprived of 
facilities and medications for psychiatric and medical treatment, 
see Hoitt v. Vitek, ;361 F. Supp. 1238, 1249 (D. N. H. 1973) ; and 
educational and rehabilitative programs can be mterrupted. More~ 
over, the fact of transfer, and perhaps the reasons al)eged therefore, 
will be put oo the record reviewed by the parole board, and the 
prisoner may have difficulty rebutting, long after the fact, t\le 
adverse mference to be drawn therefrom." Id. , at 981-982 
-
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of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected do not 
exceed those normally incident to a criminal conviction 
and are not otherwise violative of thr Constitution, the 
Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's 
treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight. 
The Clause does not require hearings in connection with 
transfers whether or not they are the result of the 
inmate's misbehavior or may be labeled tl,S disciplinary 
or punitiye. 
We also agree with the State of New York that under 
the law of that State Haymes had no right to rem~n at 
1:1,ny partic4lar prison facility and no jl-lstifiable expec-
tation th~t he would not be transferred unless found 
guilty of misconduct. Under New Yor~ law, adtllt per-
sons sentenced to imprisonment are not sentenced to• 
particular institutions bttt are committed to the custody 
of the Commissioner of Corrections. He receives adult, 
male felons at a maximum-security reception center for 
initial evafoation 1:1,nd thf)n transfers them to specified in--
sti tutions'. N. Y. Corr. Law § 71 (1); 7 N. Y'. C. R. R . 
§ 103.10. Thereafter, the Commissioner is empowered 
by statute to "transfer inmates from Qne correctional f i:i-
cility fu another."' N. Y. Corr: Law§ 23 (I). The Oourt 
of Appea}s reasoned thi:it because under the !lPPlic~ble 
state stat4tes and regulations, various specified punish-
ments were reserved a,s sanctions for breach of prison 
rules and could not therefore be imposed without appro~-
priate hearings, neither could the harsh conseq-qenoes of 
a transfer be imposed as punishment for misconduct ab-
sent af>propriate due process Pf?cediwes. l:lut -qnder· 
the New York law, the transfor of inmates is not condi-
tional upon or limited to the occurrence of misconduct. 
The statute imposes no coqditions on the discretionary 
power to transfer and we are advised by the State th&t 
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fers are not amqng the punishments which may be im-
posed only after a prison disciplinary hearing. N. Y. C. 
R. R. § 253.5. Whatever part an inmate's behavior may 
play in decision to transfer, there is ·no more basis in 
New York law for invoking the protections of the Due 
Process Clause than we found to be the case under the 
Massachusetts law in the Meachum case. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and 
the case is remanded to that court for further proceed .. 
ings consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered .. 
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JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
June 22, 1976 
RE: No. 74- 520 Montanye v. Haymes 
Dear John: 
Please join me in the dissenting opinion 




Mr. Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
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- -~ttprtmt QJo-nrt o-f tfrt 1)tni±th ~bdtg 
'lllas-Iftngfott, lI). QJ. 2llc?'1,.;t 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 22. 1976 
Re: No. 74-520 Montanye v. Haymes 
Dear John: 




Mr. Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
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